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Abstract. Public transit systems in urban areas usually require large
state subsidies, primarily due to high fare evasion rates. In this paper,
we study new models for optimizing fare inspection strategies in tran-
sit networks based on bilevel programming. In the first level, the leader
(the network operator) determines probabilities for inspecting passen-
gers at different locations, while in the second level, the followers (the
fare-evading passengers) respond by optimizing their routes given the in-
spection probabilities and travel times. To model the followers’ behavior
we study both a non-adaptive variant, in which passengers select a path
a priori and continue along it throughout their journey, and an adap-
tive variant, in which they gain information along the way and use it
to update their route. For these problems, which are interesting in their
own right, we design exact and approximation algorithms and we prove a
tight bound of 3/4 on the ratio of the optimal cost between adaptive and
non-adaptive strategies. For the leader’s optimization problem, we study
a fixed-fare and a flexible-fare variant, where ticket prices may or may
not be set at the operator’s will. For the latter variant, we design an LP
based approximation algorithm. Finally, using a local search procedure
that shifts inspection probabilities within an initially determined sup-
port set, we perform an extensive computational study for all variants
of the problem on instances of the Dutch railway and the Amsterdam
subway network. This study reveals that our solutions are within 95% of
theoretical upper bounds drawn from the LP relaxation.
1 Introduction
Fare evasion in transit systems causes significant losses to society. Recent studies
revealed an annual loss of 70 million pounds for London’s transit system [21] and
fare evasion rates of nearly 20% in Santiago’s transit system, which is subsidised
with over 700 million dollars each year [19]. As the installation of physical ticket
barriers is not always possible, cost-efficient, or desirable, many transit systems,
such as the Dutch and German railway and subway networks and the London
bus system, rely on the honesty of customers and proper controlling of valid
tickets on board. Travelers who are caught without a ticket have to pay a fine,
which is significantly larger than the ticket price.
In this paper, we study the optimization of fare inspection strategies in transit
systems taking into account realistic models for the passenger’s reaction. Our
models are based on a bilevel optimization problem (or Stackelberg game) on
the network. In the first level, the leader, who strives to maximize the revenue
from ticket sales and collected fines, determines for each edge the probability
of controlling passing passengers, representing the frequency of inspections on
that edge. In light of the limited number of inspectors available, we assume a
global budget constraint on the sum of these probabilities. Given the inspection
probabilities on edges, we assume passengers to act strategically and decide on
whether or not to buy a ticket and along which path to travel based solely on
their perceived cost. If a passenger chooses not to buy a ticket, her cost is thus
the sum of the path length (expressed in monetary units) and the expected fine
to be payed (which depends on the inspection probabilities along the path); on
the other hand, if she buys a ticket, her cost is defined as the cost of the cheapest
path considering both ticket price and distance measured in monetary units.
We perform a complete study differentiating between two different possibil-
ities for the passengers’ behavioral assumption as well as two different settings
for the leader’s decision problem. From the followers side, we consider both the
case in which they are adaptive and a non-adaptive. In the latter, each pas-
senger chooses a path at the beginning of her journey and continues along it,
independent of whether or not she encounters an inspector. In the adaptive ver-
sion, passengers adapt their behavior and consequently, when caught without
a ticket, they continue on their shortest path only considering distance (since
the fine includes a ticket to finish the trip). For the leader, we also study two
different settings. In the fixed-fare setting, we assume that ticket prices are fixed
a priori, e.g., by governmental regulations, and the leader only sets the inspec-
tion probabilities subject to a budget constraint. In the flexible-fare setting, we
assume that the leader can additionally determine ticket prices.
Our Contribution and Structure of the Paper. The main goal of this
work is to provide a comprehensive study of fare evasion and fare inspection
problems in transit networks. As mentioned above, we consider four versions
of the problem by variating on whether the followers are adaptive or not, and
wether the ticket prices are fixed or flexible. From a methodological viewpoint we
tackle the problem from different angles, designing polynomial time algorithms
and approximation schemes for the followers’ problems, studying approximation
algorithms and LP relaxations for the leader’s problem, and using a local search
heuristic to obtain high quality solutions for real-world instances.
After establishing the precise model in Section 2, we study the two variants of
the followers’ minimization problem in Section 3. These are natural extensions of
the classic shortest path problem and exhibit interesting properties on their own
which go beyond the particular application in this work. For the non-adaptive
variant, we design a fully polynomial time approximation scheme for general net-
work topologies, exploiting similarities between this problem and the restricted
shortest path problem (RSP). Interestingly we also obtain an exact polynomial
time algorithm for series-parallel graphs, in sharp contrast to RSP, which is still
NP -hard in these graphs. For adaptive followers, we obtain an exact polynomial
time algorithm for general graphs using an optimal substructure property of the
problem. Surprisingly, we further show that for arbitrary probability distribu-
tions, the optimal solution to the non-adaptive followers’ minimization problem
is at most a factor 4/3 away from the optimal solution to the adaptive variant,
and we also show that this bound is tight.
In Section 4, we turn our attention to the leader’s maximization problem
and prove that all four variants of this problem are strongly NP-hard. We then
present an LP relaxation that yields a valid upper bound on the achievable profit
for all four variants, and also obtain a (1−1/e)-approximation algorithm for the
variant involving flexible ticket prices and non-adaptive followers. Combining
this with the worst-case gap from the preceding section yields a 34 (1 − 1/e)-
approximation for the variant with adaptive followers. Finally, we develop a
local search procedure that shifts inspection probabilities within an initially de-
termined support set of edges. As candidate support sets, we use solutions from
an LP relaxation, a minimum multicut, and a related mixed integer program [1].
In Section 5, we demonstrate the applicability of our local search approach
for all four problem variants by conducting an extensive computational study
comprising a total of 5600 instances based on the networks of the Dutch railway
system, the Amsterdam metro system, and randomly generated graphs. Our
study reveals that the objective values of the computed solutions are within
95% of the calculated upper bound on average.
Related Work. Bilevel network pricing problems have been considered ex-
tensively in the literature; see [6,7,15]. In these works, the leader prices edges of
some subgraph and the followers choose shortest paths with respect to edge costs
defined as the sum of travel costs and prices. This problem has been proved to be
NP-hard; see [15] and [4,5,18] for further hardness and approximability results.
Borndo¨rfer et al. [1,2] investigated a problem similar to our variant of non-
adaptive followers and fixed ticket prices. In contrast to our model, they assume
the cost of the followers to be given by the sum of travel costs and probabilities,
reducing the followers minimization problem to a standard shortest path prob-
lem. Based on this simplification, the authors derive a compact mixed integer
program (MIP) for the leader’s optimization problem and solve it on several test
instances derived from the German motorway network. In addition, they also
study the case where the leader wants to minimize the number of fare evaders.
In contrast, we model the followers’ response more precisely by considering the
exact expected fine along a path, leading to a nonlinear aggregation of proba-
bilities. In our computational study, we systematically compare the difference
between both modeling approaches. We show that the quality of plain MIP so-
lutions (as in [1,2]) is on average over all instances 5% lower than our solutions
when taking the exact followers response into account. For instances derived
from the Amsterdam metro network, our solution improves even by 7.4% on
average, with an improvement of more than 20% on some instances.
There is a body of literature on so-called network security games, where
a defender can check a limited number of edges in a graph and the attacker
computes from a given set of source and target nodes a path connecting a source
and a target; see [14,20,23]. The payoff for the attacker (and defender) has a
binary characteristic since it only depends on whether or not the attacker has
been caught. In Lin et al. [16], a single defender moves through the network over
time to detect attackers. The authors propose a linear program which solves the
problem to optimality for small instances, and heuristics which solve the problem
for larger instances within 1% of optimality.
Yin et al. [24] study a fare inspection model similar to ours. In contrast to our
work, passengers are assumed to follow a fixed route through the network. In [3],
the problem of computing tours of inspectors for a given distribution of traffic
flows is considered. The authors derive an integer programming formulation and
conduct a computational study on the German motorway network.
2 The Model
We we are given a directed graph G = (V,E) with costs c : E → Z+ modeling
the transit times on the edges (as monetary cost incurred to the passengers
traveling along them). In order to prevent fare evasion, the network operator
(the leader) sets inspection probabilities pe ∈ [0, 1] on the edges subject to the
budget constraint
∑
e∈E pe ≤ B, where B ≥ 0 corresponds to a limited number
of ticket inspectors. We first describe the passengers’ reaction to the chosen
inspection strategy and then discuss the resulting revenue for the operator.
The followers. Passengers (the followers) are modeled by a set of commodities
K. For every commodity i ∈ K, a demand di ≥ 0 is given that specifies the
number of passengers with origin si ∈ V and destination ti ∈ V . Passengers of
commodity i can either buy a ticket at price Ti ≥ 0 or choose a path without
paying the ticket. If a passenger is caught without a valid ticket he has to pay
a fine F ≥ 0 satisfying F ≥ Ti. As in most public transport systems (e.g.,
the Dutch or German sub- and railway networks) the fine includes the ticket
price and enables the passenger to continue his trip. Passengers are assumed to
be rational, deciding purely based on their personal costs, which is expressed
as the sum of travel times along the chosen path and the monetary cost. In the
following, we differentiate between a non-adaptive and an adaptive variant of the
followers response. In both settings, passengers of commodity i can either chose
to pay the ticket and follow the shortest path w.r.t. c, or decide to evade the
fare, choosing a path P ∈ Pi that minimizes a variant-dependent cost function
(where Pi denotes the set of si-ti-paths).
Non-adaptive followers. In the non-adaptive variant, passengers are assumed to
choose a route before the start of their trip and continue along it independent
of whether or not they encounter an inspector. For a path P , we denote its total
travel time by c(P ) :=
∑
e∈P ce, and we denote the probability that no inspector
is encountered along P by π(P ) :=
∏
e∈P (1 − pe). Given probabilities p, the
expected cost of path P for passenger i in the non-adaptive setting is
fN,p,i(P ) := c(P ) + (1− π(P )) · F.
This variant is plausible under the assumption that passengers have determined
their route beforehand (via checking the route and timetables). We denote the
corresponding optimization problem by FMPN.
Adaptive followers. In the adaptive variant, once a passenger is caught, he will
continue his trip along the shortest path (w.r.t. c). Letting SPc(v, w) denote the
shortest path distance from v to w w.r.t. c, the follower thus tries to find a path
P = (e1, . . . , ek) ∈ Pi with ei = (vi, vi+1) minimizing the expected cost
fA,p,i(P ) :=
k∑
i=1
i−1∏
j=1
(
1− pej
)
·
(
cei + pei
(
F + SPc(vi+1, t)
))
.
Note that in this formula, the ith summand corresponds to the event of vi be-
ing reached without inspection, in which case ei is traversed next. This variant
assumes that passengers know the shortest paths from all stations to their des-
tination in a network, e.g., by calculating it using a portable computing device.
We denote the corresponding optimization problem by FMPA.
The leader. The leader’s problem can be defined as a bilevel problem, where
the leader sets probabilities on the edges to which the followers respond by
solving their individual optimization problems. While we will always assume the
fine F to be fixed in the problem input (fines are commonly determined by the
legislation [12]), we will consider both the scenario where ticket prices are fixed
a priori and the scenario where they are flexible and can be determined by the
leader as part of his optimization problem. Combining this with the two different
models for the followers’ reaction, we obtain four different versions of the leader’s
maximization problem, which we will denote by LMPLX , with L ∈ {fix, flex}
and X ∈ {N,A} specifying the ticket pricing variant and the behaviour of the
followers, respectively. Accordingly, we denote by ΓLX,i(p) the leader’s revenue
per passenger received from commodity i when choosing inspection probabilities
p. The leader thus wants to maximize
∑
i∈K diΓ
L
X,i(p).
Fixed Fares. In the fixed-fare setting, the revenue received from passenger i is
either the ticket price or the expected revenue from collecting fines, i.e.,
Γ fixX,i(p) := max
{
F · (1− π(P )) : P ∗ ∈ argmin
P∈Pi∪{PTi }
fX,p,i(P )
}
,
where PTi denotes a special path representing the option of paying the ticket
with fX,p,i(P
T
i ) := SPc(si, ti) + Ti and π(P
T
i ) := 1− Ti/F .
Flexible Fares. When the leader is allowed to determine the ticket prices, he
can ensure that every passenger chooses to buy a ticket by setting the prices
sufficiently low. The maximum value a passenger is willing to pay for a ticket is
Γ flexX,i (p) := min{fX,p,i(P )− SPc(si, ti) : P ∈ Pi},
because for this ticket price, the cost of paying the ticket and traveling along the
shortest path is at most the expected cost of his best fare evasion option.
3 The Followers’ Minimization Problem
In this section, we design efficient algorithms of both variants of the followers’
minimization problem. Throughout this section, we assume we are given the
graph G = (V,E), the start s ∈ V and destination t ∈ V of a given follower,
costs c, probabilities p, and the fine F .
Non-adaptive Followers’ Minimization Problem. The non-adaptive ver-
sion of the followers’ minimization problem is related to the restricted shortest
path problem (RSP): If P ∗ is an s-t-path minimizing fN, then P
∗ also maximizes
π(P ∗) among all paths with c(P ) ≤ C∗ := c(P ∗). By discretizing the set of
possible values for C∗, this relation can be used to derive an FPTAS for FMPN;
see Appendix A.1 for a detailed proof.
Theorem 1. There is an algorithm for FMPN that computes a (1+ε)-approximate
solution in time polynomial in 1
ε
, log cmax, |V |, and |E|.
It is well-known that RSP is NP -hard even on a very restricted subclass of
series-parallel graphs. Given the similarity of the two problems, it seems natural
to expect this hardness result to carry over to FMPN. Surprisingly, it turns out
that FMPN can be solved exactly in polynomial time on series-parallel graphs.
Theorem 2. There is an algorithm that computes an optimal solution to in-
stances of FMPN with series-parallel graphs in polynomial time.
Sketch of proof. The algorithm makes use of the inductive definition of a series-
parallel graph as the series or parallel composition of two smaller series-parallel
graphs. It recursively decomposes the graph and computes for each of the two
subgraphs a set of candidate subpaths through them. It can be shown that an
optimal path through the entire graph can be obtained from a composition of
those candidate subpaths. By carefully bounding the probability of an inspection
on the entire path depending on the parameters of the corresponding subpaths,
we can restrict ourselves to a polynomial number of combinations of subpaths. A
complete description and analysis of the algorithm can be found in Appendix A.2.
An exact algorithm for general graphs. We also provide an exact, however non-
polynomial, algorithm for FMPN on general graphs. The algorithm is based
on a bidirectional vertex labeling approach and enumerating all Pareto-optimal
paths, where a path P is dominated by a path P ′ if both c(P ) ≥ c(P ′) and
π(P ) ≤ π(P ′). The algorithm is described in detail in Appendix A.3. In order to
speed up the enumeration, we use an adaptation of contraction hierarchies [11],
a preprocessing technique that performs node contractions, enabling a more
efficient traversal of the paths in the graph. This technique is known to work
especially well on sparse graphs, a common property of transit networks.
Adaptive Followers’ Minimization Problem. The adaptive version of the
followers minimization problem can be solved in polynomial time using a label
setting algorithm. The algorithm makes use of the following observation on the
structure of the cost function fA, with P [v, w] denoting the v-w-subpath of P .
Lemma 1. fA(P ) = fA(P [s, v]) + π(P [s, v]) · fA(P [v, t]).
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 1, we can deduce that every suffix
of an optimal path must also be an optimal path.4
Corollary 1. Let P ∗ be an s-t-path minimizing fA and let v ∈ V (P ∗). Then
P ∗[v, t] is a v-t-path minimizing fA.
In the spirit of Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm [9], our algorithm iteratively
computes the cost of an optimal v-t-path for some vertex v. It maintains the set
S of vertices for which an optimal path has been computed and a value φ(v)
for every vertex v ∈ V , denoting the cost of the cheapest v-t-path found so far.
In every iteration, a vertex w ∈ V \ S with minimum value φ(w) is added to S
and the labels φ(v) of vertices v with (v, w) ∈ E are updated accordingly. The
complete algorithm and its analysis can be found in Appendix A.4.
Theorem 3. There is an algorithm that solves FMPA in time O(|E|+|V | log |V |).
The Impact of Adaptivity. We now prove a tight upper bound of 4/3 on the
ratio of the optimal cost between non-adaptive and adaptive strategies.
Theorem 4. Let OPTN be the cost of an optimal non-adaptive solution and
OPTA be the cost of an optimal adaptive solution. Then OPTN ≤
4
3OPTA.
Proof. Let P be a path that minimizes fA. Observe that
OPTA = fA(P ) ≥ π(P )c(P ) + (1− π(P ))(SPc(s, t) + F ),
where the inequality is due to the fact that in any case, the passenger has at
least to traverse a shortest path from s to t. Furthermore,
OPTN ≤ min {c(P ) + (1 − π(P ))F, SPc(s, t) + F}
4 Note however that the same is not true for prefixes of the optimal path, as the arcs
of P [s, v] also appear in the second summand.
as both P and a shortest path from s to t are feasible non-adaptive solutions.
Thus,
OPTN
OPTA
≤ max
p∈[0,1], F≥0
0≤S≤C
min {C + pF, S + F}
(1− p)C + p(S + F )
≤ max
p∈[0,1]
1
1− p+ p2
≤
4
3
,
where the second inequality comes from the fact that the maximum is attained
for C + pF = S + F . ⊓⊔
The following example shows that the bound given in Theorem 4 is tight.
Example 1. Let V = {s, v, t} and E = {e0, e1, e2} where e0 goes from s to v and
e1 and e2 are two parallel arcs from v to t. The travel costs are ce0 = ce1 = 0 and
ce2 = 1, the inspection probabilities are pe0 = 1/2, pe1 = 1, and pe2 = 0, and
F = 2. Observe that there are only two s-t-paths P1 = (e0, e1) and P2 = (e0, e2)
and that fN(P1) = fN(P2) = 2 and fA(P2) =
3
2 , yielding a ratio of
4
3 between
optimal non-adaptive and adaptive strategies.
Remark 1. Note that in the proof of Theorem 4, we did not make use of the fact
that the probability π(P ) is determined by individual probabilities on the arcs
of the network. Therefore, the bound of 43 given by the theorem is still true for
arbitrary probabilities π(P ) for each path P . In particular, the result still holds
if inspections at specific edges are not independent events.
4 The Leader’s Maximization Problem
In this section, we discuss algorithms and complexity results for the leader’s
maximization problem. On the theoretical side, we derive NP -hardness for a
restricted special case of the problem and an LP relaxation, which yields upper
bounds on the profit for all four model variants. For the flexible-fare setting, we
also obtain a constant factor approximation. On the practical side, we propose a
local search procedure that, combined with initial solutions from the LP relax-
ation computes close-to-optimal solutions for all four variants of the problem.
Complexity of the Leader’s Problem. The following NP -hardness result
can be derived by a simple reduction from the directed multicut problem; see
Appendix B.1.
Theorem 5. LMPLX for L ∈ {fix, flex} and X ∈ {A,N} is strongly NP -hard,
even when restricted to instances with |K| = 2 and c ≡ 0.
LP Relaxation. Let OPTLX denote the value of an optimal solution to the
corresponding version of the leaders maximization problem for L ∈ {flex, fix}
and X ∈ {A,N}. The following lemmas relate these values to one another.
Lemma 2. OPTflexN ≥ OPT
fix
N and OPT
flex
A ≥ OPT
fix
A .
Lemma 3. 43OPT
flex
A ≥ OPT
flex
N ≥ OPT
flex
A .
In order to obtain the LP relaxation, we will make use of a linearization
approach, which is based on the following classic approximation.
Lemma 4. 1− π(P ) ≤ min
{∑
e∈P pe, 1
}
≤ 11−e−1 (1− π(P )).
Using Lemma 4, we replace the term 1 − π(P ) in the followers’ objective
function by
∑
e∈P pe. Note that after this replacement, the non-adaptive version
of FMP corresponds to a classic shortest path problem. Using the dual of the
shortest path LP, we derive the following LP relaxation for LMPflexN .
[LP] max
∑
i∈K
di(yi(ti)−yi(si)− SPc(si, ti))
s.t.
∑
e∈E
pe ≤ B
yi(w)− yi(v) ≤ ce + Fpe ∀ i ∈ K, e = (v, w) ∈ E
pe ∈ [0, 1] ∀ e ∈ E
The value OPTLP of an optimal solution to [LP] yields an upper bound to
all four variants of the leader’s maximization problem.
Lemma 5. OPTLP ≥ OPT
L
X for all L ∈ {flex, fix} and X ∈ {A,N}.
Using Lemmas 3 and 4, we can also derive that using an optimal solution to
[LP] yields approximation algorithms for LMPflexN and LMP
flex
A .
Theorem 6. There is a (1− 1/ e)-approximation algorithm for LMPflexN .
Corollary 2. There is a 34 (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for LMP
flex
A .
The analysis of the algorithm given in Theorem 6 is tight. A corresponding
instance is described in Appendix B.2, along with the proofs of the preceding re-
sults. There, it is also shown that [LP] does not yield any constant approximation
guarantees for the fixed-fare setting.
Local Search Framework. We conclude this section by presenting a general
local search framework to compute close-to-optimal solutions to the leader’s
maximization problem. The approach can be applied to all four model variants
by using the corresponding followers’ response and leader’s objective function.
The Algorithm. In addition to an instance of LMPLX , the input for the algorithm
consists of a candidate subset S ⊆ E of the graph edges and an initial setting of
probabilities on these edges. An improving move of the local search chooses two
disjoint subsets E+, E− ⊂ S with |E+|, |E−| ≤ k for an input parameter k. The
probabilities on the edges in E−are uniformly decreased up to a total decrease
of ∆′ = min{∆,
∑
e∈E− pe,
∑
e∈E+ 1 − pe}, where ∆ > 0 is an exponentially
decreasing step size. Then, the probabilities on the edges in E+are uniformly
increased up to a total increase of ∆′. The framework then recomputes the fol-
lowers’ response, and accepts the move, if the leader’s profit increases or reverts
it, otherwise. The algorithm terminates, if the improvement in the objective is
below a given threshold for a given number of consecutive iterations.
Initial Solutions. The performance of the local search framework depends cru-
cially on the choice of candidate edges and the corresponding initial solution.
We tested several methods for generating such solutions. The first is solving the
LP relaxation [LP] and using the support of the resulting solutions as candidate
edge set. The second is computing a minimum cardinality directed multicut in
the graph separating all terminal pairs, and then distributing the budget uni-
formly among the arcs in the cut. In addition, we also used the solutions from
the MIP formulation given in [1] for the fixed price setting.
5 Computational Study
In this section, we present an extensive computational study on a broad set
of realistic instances, assessing the solution quality of our local search approach
and the impact of our new modelling approach compared to existing models. See
Appendix C for a complete overview of our computational results and details of
implementation and generation of instances.
Test Instances. Experiments were performed on two different instance sets.
The first set comprises the complete networks of the Amsterdam subway system
and the Dutch railway system, as well as a subnetwork of the latter restricted
to major transport hubs. The data was acquired from Dutch Railways [17]. Due
to privacy regulations, no real-world passenger data was available. Therefore,
for each network, we generated ten instances each with 25, 50, 100, and 200
commodities by choosing pairs of vertices uniformly at random, and drawing
the corresponding demands uniformly at random from the interval [1, 50]. Ticket
prices were determined using a linearized variant of the formula used in official
regulations, and travel costs (in monetary units) were calculated from actual
travel times with a conversion rate of 0.132 Euro per minute travel time; see [17].
The second instance set comprises randomly generated planar graphs exhibiting
characteristics similar to those of real-world networks [22]. The graphs were
generated using an approach similar to the one in [8]. We generated ten graphs
for each possible combination of |V |, |K| ∈ {25, 50, 100, 200}. For all instances,
we tested 20 different values of budgets from the range of 0.2 to 25. In total this
yields 800 instances for each of three real-world networks and each of the four
graph size classes of the randomized set, yielding 5600 instances in total.
Algorithms. As algorithms for computing start solutions of the local search,
we tested the LP relaxation (LP) and a minimum cardinality multi-cut com-
puted using a standard MIP formulation (MC). In order to assess the impact
LMPfixN LMP
fix
A LMP
flex
N LMP
flex
A
graph set best LP LPLS ∆MIP best LP LP
LS LP LPLS LP LPLS
nlmajor 97.4 94.8 97.3 2.09 97.4 94.1 97.2 96.4 98.0 96.4 98.0
nlcomplete 94.6 91.6 93.2 1.28 93.8 90.9 92.6 97.8 97.9 97.7 97.9
adammetro 98.2 94.7 97.7 7.09 98.2 94.7 97.8 94.7 97.8 94.7 97.8
small 97.0 92.1 96.3 4.54 96.8 88.1 96.0 95.3 97.5 95.3 97.4
medium 96.3 90.7 95.2 4.79 96.0 88.9 95.0 95.5 97.5 95.4 97.3
large 95.7 90.4 95.1 4.82 95.3 88.6 94.5 96.6 98.0 96.5 97.8
huge 95.6 89.1 94.1 4.03 94.6 85.2 92.7 96.5 97.9 96.4 97.7
Table 1: Average ratios between solutions and upper bounds in percent. ’best’
denotes the average over the best solutions found for each instance, LP denotes
the solutions found by [LP], LPLS denotes the solution found by performing the
local search heuristic on the LP solution, and ∆MIP denotes the improvement of
’best’ compared to the solution found by using the MIP from [1].
of the more precise followers’ objective function in our model as compared to
existing approaches, we additionally computed the mixed integer programming
solutions from [1] (MIP). The follower’s response in the local search procedure
was computed using the exact algorithms for the respective variants presented in
Section 3. After initial experiments for fine-tuning the parameters of the frame-
work, it turned out that restricting to k = 1, i.e., probability shifts from one edge
to another, is already sufficient for obtaining close-to-optimal solutions within
30 iterations. We also set the initial step length ∆ to 0.1, decreasing it by a
factor of 0.9 in every iteration.
Solution Quality. Table 1 and Figure 1 show average gaps for all models on
the test instances. With the exception of few instances with very high budget,
results from LPLS consistently dominated those of MCLS. We therefore omitted
stating the results of the latter. Solutions for the fixed-fare variant are within
95% of the upper bounds on average, while solutions for the flexible-fare variant
are within 97.5%. This slight difference can be explained by the fact that the
same upper bound was used for all four variants.
Impact of the Budget Size. We also investigated the impact of budget sizes
on the optimality gap and the achieved profit; see Figure 2 in Appendix C for a
visualization. In the range of B ∈ [1, 4], the ratio of obtained profit and upper
bound exhibits a bath tub curve behavior until it stabilizes at a ratio of 1 for
larger budgets (which is expected as for a large enough budget, all passengers
can be forced to buy a ticket). The achievable profit as a function of the budget
is concave in all investigated examples, which might be a universal property of
the optimal value function (as a function of the budget).
Comparison with Existing Models. For the fixed-fare variant with non-
adaptive followers, we can compare our modelling approach to that of [1]. We
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Fig. 1: Ratio of profits to upper bounds. The diagrams show the distribution of
the ratios for instances in the respective test sets. The mark inside each box
denotes the median, boxes represent lower and upper quartiles and the whisker
ends show the minimum and maximum, respectively, apart from possible outliers
marked by a cycle. The diagrams were plotted following the suggestions in [10].
solved the MIP formulation proposed in [1] and computed the leader’s profit
resulting from the realistic response of followers (i.e., without linearization of
their objective function). Comparing these solutions to the ones derived from
our local search procedure, we observed that our approach yields an increase in
profit of about 5% on average on the randomly generated instances, about 7.5%
on the metro, and about 2% on the railway network. In fact for some of the
metro instances, the increase exceeds 20%; see Table 1 and Figure 1.
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A Appendix for the Followers’ Minimization Problem
(Section 3)
A.1 An FPTAS for FMPN (Proof of Theorem 1)
Theorem 1. There is an algorithm for FMPN that computes a (1+ε)-approximate
solution in time polynomial in 1
ε
, log cmax, |V |, and |E|.
Proof. Define cmax := maxe∈E ce, k := ⌈log1+ε |V |cmax⌉, and Ci := (1 + ε)
i
for i ∈ [k]. For each i ∈ [k], we use the restricted shortest path algorithm by
Hassin [13] to compute a path Pi with c(Pi) ≤ (1 + ε)Ci and π(Pi) ≥ π(P )
for all P with c(P ) ≤ Ci. Choose a path P ′ from P0, . . . , Pk minimizing fN(P ′)
among all si-ti-paths of the graph. Let P
∗ be an s-t-path minimizing fN and
define i∗ := min{i ∈ [k] : c(P ∗) ≤ Ci}. Then c(Pi∗) ≤ (1 + ε)2c(P ∗) and
π(Pi∗) ≥ π(P ∗) and thus fN(P ′) ≤ fN(Pi∗) ≤ (1 + ε)2fN(P ∗). ⊓⊔
A.2 An Exact Polynomial Time Algorithm for FMPN on
Series-Parallel Graphs (Proof of Theorem 2)
Our algorithm makes use of the inductive definition of a series-parallel graph
as the series or parallel composition of two smaller series-parallel graphs. It
recursively decomposes the graph and computes for each of the two smaller
graphs a set of paths together with corresponding intervals. These paths and
intervals will fulfil the following property: If an optimal path P ∗ traverses the
subgraph G′, then π(P ∗) must be in one of the intervals of the subgraph and the
subpath of P ∗ in G′ must have the same cost and inspection probability as the
path corresponding to the interval. We can thus replace this part of P ∗ by the
corresponding path without changing the objective function value. This implies
that for the original graph G, one of the polynomially many paths computed by
the procedure must be optimal.
We start with a simple observation, which is true for FMPN in any graph
and will be useful in our algorithm.
Lemma A1. Let P1 and P2 be two s-t-paths and let v, w ∈ V (P1) ∩ V (P2). For
i ∈ {1, 2} define ci := c(Pi[v, w]) and πi := π(Pi[v, w]). Assume c1 > c2 and
π1 > π2.
– If P1 minimizes fN among all s-t-paths, then π(P1) ≥
c1 − c2
π1 − π2
·
π1
F
.
– If P2 minimizes fN among all s-t-paths, then
c1 − c2
π1 − π2
·
π2
F
≥ π(P2).
Proof. Consider the path P ′ := P1[s, v] ◦ P2[v, w] ◦ P1[w, t]. As P1 minimizes fN
we have
0 ≤ fN(P
′)− fN(P1) = c2 − c1 + (1 −
π2
π1
)π(P1)F.
This immediately implies the claimed lower bound on π(P1). The upper bound
for π(P2) follows analogously. ⊓⊔
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for FMPN on Series-parallel Graphs
(P , ℓ, u)← findPaths(G, s, t, c, p, F )
Choose P ′ ∈ argminP∈P fN(P ).
return P ′
procedure findPaths(G = (V,E), s, t, c, p, F )
if E = {(s, t)} then
P ← (s, t); ℓ(P ) = 0; u(P ) = 1
P = {P}
else if G is series composition of G1 and G2 joined at v then
(P1, ℓ1, u1)← findPaths(G1, s, v, c, p, F )
(P2, ℓ2, u2)← findPaths(G2, v, t, c, p, F )
P ← ∅
for each P1 ∈ P1, P2 ∈ P2 with [ℓ1(P1), u1(P1)] ∩ [ℓ2(P2), u2(P2)] 6= ∅ do
P ← P1 ◦ P2
ℓ(P )← max{ℓ1(P1), ℓ2(P2)}
u(P )← min{u1(P1), u2(P2)}
P ← P ∪ {P}
end for
else if G is parallel composition of G1 and G2 then
(P1, ℓ1, u1)← findPaths(G1, s, t, c, p, F )
(P2, ℓ2, u2)← findPaths(G2, s, t, c, p, F )
P ← P1 ∪ P2
for each P ∈ P do
ℓ(P )← 0; u(P )← 1
for each P ′ ∈ P \ {P} do
if c(P ) ≤ c(P ′) then
if π(P ) ≥ π(P ′) then
P ← P \ {P ′}
else if π(P ) < π(P ′) then
u(P )← min
{
u(P ), c(P )−c(P
′)
pi(P )−pi(P ′)
pi(P )
F
}
end if
else if c(P ) > c(P ′) then
if π(P ) ≤ π(P ′) then
P ← P \ {P}
else if π(P ) > π(P ′) then
ℓ(P )← max
{
ℓ(P ), c(P )−c(P
′)
pi(P )−pi(P ′)
pi(P )
F
}
end if
end if
end for
end for
end if
return (P , ℓ, u)
end procedure
The formal listing of Algorithm 1 comprises the procedure findPaths, which
computes the intervals and corresponding paths by performing the series-parallel
decomposition. Corresponding to this decomposition, it distinguishes three cases,
which are described and analyzed in the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma A2. Let G′ = (V ′, E′) be a series-parallel subgraph of G with start
vertex s′ and end vertex t′. The set of paths P and corresponding interval bounds
ℓ and u computed by findPaths(G′, s′, t′, c, p, F ) fulfill the following properties.
– |P| ≤ |E′|
– [ℓ(P ), u(P )] ∩ [ℓ(P ′), u(P ′)] = ∅ for P 6= P ′
– If P ∗ is an s-t-path in G minimizing fN with s
′, t′ ∈ V (P ∗) and P ∗[s′, t′] ⊆
E′, then there is an s′-t′-path P ∈ P with π(P ∗) ∈ [ℓ(P ), u(P )], c(P ∗[s′, t′]) =
c(P ), and π(P ∗[s′, t′]) = π(P ).
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the algorithm.
– Case 1: G′ is only the single edge (s′, t′). In this case, findPaths returns the
corresponding single-edge path and the statement of the lemma is trivially
fulfilled.
– Case 2: G′ is the series composition of two series-parallel graphs G1 and G2
joined at a vertex v. Let (P1, ℓ1, u1) and (P2, ℓ2, u2) be the sets of paths and
interval bounds computed by findPaths for G1 and G2, respectively. Every
path P ∈ P in the set computed for G′ corresponds to the concatenation
of two paths P1 ∈ P1 and P2 ∈ P2 such that the corresponding intervals
[ℓ1(P1), u1(P1)] and [ℓ2(P2), u2(P2)] intersect. Every intersection starts either
with a value ℓ1(P1) or a value ℓ2(P2). As the intervals defined by ℓ1 and
u1 (ℓ2 and u2, respectively) are disjoint, every value of ℓ2(P2) (of ℓ1(P1),
respectively) occurs at most in one intersection. Therefore |P| ≤ |P1|+|P2| ≤
|E′|.
If P ∗ traverses G′, it also has to traverse both G1 and G2. By induction hy-
pothesis, there is an s′-v-path P1 ∈ P1 such that P ∗[s′, v] ∈ [ℓ1(P1), u1(P1)],
c(P ∗[s′, v]) = c(P1), and π(P
∗[s′, v]) = π(P1). Furthermore, there is a v-t
′-
path P2 ∈ P2 such that P ∗[v, t′] ∈ [ℓ2(P2), u2(P2)], c(P ∗[v, t′]) = c(P2), and
π(P ∗[v, t′]) = π(P2). This implies [ℓ1(P1), u1(P1)] ∩ [ℓ2(P2), u2(P2)] 6= ∅ and
therefore P := P1 ◦ P2 is in P and fulfills
c(P ∗[s′, t′]) = c(P ∗[s′, v]) + c(P ∗[v, t′]) = c(P )
and
π(P ∗[s′, t′]) = π(P ∗[s′, v]) · π(P ∗[v, t′]) = π(P ).
Therefore, the statement of the lemma is true in this case.
– Case 3: G′ is the parallel composition of two series-parallel graphs G1 and
G2. Let (P1, ℓ1, u1) and (P2, ℓ2, u2) be the sets of paths and interval bounds
computed by findPaths for G1 and G2, respectively. The set P computed
for G′ consists of a subset of the paths from P1 and P2. Therefore |P| ≤
|P1|+ |P2| ≤ |E′|. Let P, P ′ ∈ P . Without loss of generality, we can assume
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for FMPN on General Graphs
P ← ∅
S ← {(s, P0)} ⊲ P0 is an empty s-s-path
while S 6= ∅ do
Choose (v, P ) ∈ S minimizing c(P ) + F · (1− π(P )).
S ← S \ (v, P )
for each e = (v, w) ∈ δ+(v) do
P ′ ← P ◦ (e)
c(P ′)← c(P ) + ce
π(P ′)← π(P ) · (1− pe)
if c(P ′) < c(P ∗) or π(P ′) < π(P ∗) for all (w,P ∗) ∈ S then
if w = t then
P ← P ∪ P ′
else
S ← S ∪ {(w,P ′)}
end if
end if
end for
end while
return P ∈ P minimizing c(P ) + F · (1− π(P ))
c(P ) > c(P ′) and π(P ) > π(P ′), as otherwise either P or P ′ were removed
from P . Therefore
ℓ(P ) ≥
c(P )− c(P ′)
π(P )− π(P ′)
π(P )
F
>
c(P )− c(P ′)
π(P )− π(P ′)
π(P ′)
F
≥ u(P ′)
by construction of u and ℓ. The corresponding intervals of P and P ′ are thus
disjoint.
If P ∗ is an s-t-path minimizing fN that traverses G
′, then it either traverses
G1 or it traverses G2. There thus is a path P ∈ P1 ∪ P2 with c(P ) = c(P ∗)
and π(P ) = π(P ∗). Note that P is only removed from P if there is a path
P ′ with c(P ′) ≤ c(P ) and π(P ′) ≥ π(P ). By optimality of P ∗, we must have
c(P ′) = c(P ) and π(P ′) = π(P ). Thus, we can assume P ∈ P without loss
of generality. It remains to show π(P ∗) ∈ [l(P ), u(P )]. If ℓ(P ) > 0, then
there is an s′-t′-path P ′ in G′ such that c(P ) > c(P ′) and π(P ) > π(P ′) and
ℓ(P ) = c(P )−c(P
′)
pi(P )−pi(P ′)
pi(P )
F
. Thus, Lemma A1 implies π(P ∗) = π(P ) ≥ ℓ(P ).
Analogously, π(P ∗) ≤ u(P ). ⊓⊔
Lemma A2 directly implies the optimality of the path computed by Algo-
rithm 1 as well as the polynomiality of the algorithm, concluding the proof of
Theorem 2.
A.3 An Exact Algorithm for FMPN on General Graphs
We give a complete description of the exact (non-polynomial) algorithm for
computing optimal solutions to FMPN on general graphs. Our algorithm is based
on enumerating all Pareto-optimal paths. A path P is dominated by a path P ′
if both c(P ) ≥ c(P ′) and π(P ) ≤ π(P ′). For a vertex v ∈ V , a set of s-v-paths
P is a dominating set, if for every s-v-path P in G there is a path P ′ ∈ P that
dominates P . Note that if P ′ dominates P then fN(P
′) ≤ fN(P ). Therefore, a
dominating set of s-t-paths contains an s-t-path minimizing fN. The algorithm
uses bidirectional label setting to a compute a dominating set for every vertex
v ∈ V . It then returns an s-t-path which minimizes fN.
As an important pre-processing step for the algorithm, we used contraction
hierarchies [11]. Vertices in the graph are contracted in a certain order, removing
them while preserving the shortest paths distances between remaining vertices
by adding shortcuts, i.e. an edge e = (u,w) is added when contracting a vertex v,
if u and w are adjacent to v and the shortest path from u to w is ((u, v), (v, w)).
Newly created shortcuts are added to the original graph. The sparseness of the
resulting graph and the performance of the preprocessing depend crucially on
the criteria used to determine the contraction order. In our setting an order that
prioritizes contractions causing a large number of shortcuts turned out to be
particularly efficient.
A.4 An Exact Algorithm for FMPA (Proofs of Lemma 1
and Theorem 3)
We give a complete description of the exact polynomial time algorithm for
FMPA. We start with the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. fA(P ) = fA(P [s, v]) + π(P [s, v]) · fA(P [v, t]).
Proof. Let P = (e1, . . . , ek) with ei = (vi, vi+1) and assume v = vk′ for some k
′
with 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k + 1. Observe that
fA(P ) =
k∑
i=1
i−1∏
j=1
(
1− pej
)
·
(
cei + pei
(
F + SPc(vi+1, t)
))
=
k′−1∑
i=1
i−1∏
j=1
(
1− pej
)
·
(
cei + pei
(
F + SPc(vi+1, t)
))
+
k′−1∏
j=1
(
1− pej
) k∑
i=k′
i−1∏
j=k′
(
1− pej
)
·
(
cei + pei
(
F + SPc(vi+1, t)
))
= fA(P [s, v]) +
∏
e∈P [s,v]
(1− pe) · fA(P [v, t]). ⊓⊔
In the spirit of Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm [9], the algorithm iteratively
computes the cost of an optimal v-t-path for some vertex v. It maintains the set
S of vertices for which an optimal path has been computed and a value φ(v) for
every vertex v ∈ V , denoting the cost of the cheapest v-t-path found so far. In
every iteration, a vertex w ∈ V \S with minimum value φ(w) is added to S and
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for FMPA
φ(t)← 0
φ(v)←∞ for all v ∈ V \ {t}
S ← ∅
while s /∈ S do
Choose w ∈ V \ S minimizing φ.
S ← S ∪ {w}
for each e = (v, w) ∈ δ−(w) do
φ′ ← ce + pe(SPc(w) + F ) + (1− pe)φ(w)
if φ′ < φ(v) do
φ(v)← φ′
next(v)← e
end if
end for each
end while
w ← s; P ← ∅
while w 6= t do
e← next(w); w ← head(e)
Add e to P .
end while
return P
the labels φ(v) of vertices v with (v, w) ∈ E are updated if a v-t-path consisting
of (v, w) and an optimal w-t-path is cheaper than the current value of φ(v). A
complete listing is given as Algorithm 3.
Lemma A3. When vertex v ∈ V is added to the set S in Algorithm 3, then there
is an optimal v-t-path Pv with fA(Pv) = φ(v) starting with the edge next(v).
Proof. By contradiction assume the lemma is not true. Without loss of generality
let v be the first vertex added to S that does not fulfill the statement of the lemma
and consider the moment when v is added to S. Note that v 6= t, as t fulfills
the requirements with φ(t) = 0 and Pt = ∅. Let next(v) = e = (v, w) for some
w ∈ S. As v is the first vertex violating the lemma, there is a w-t-path Pw with
fA(Pw) = φ(w). Thus, Pv := (e) ◦ Pw is a v-t-path with cost
fA(Pv) = ce + pe(SPc(w, t) + F ) + (1 − ce)φ(w) = φ(v).
Let P ′ be any v-t-path, let e′ = (v′, w′) be the last edge on P ′ with v′ ∈ V \ S
and w′ ∈ S. Note that
c(P ′) + F ≥ ce′ + pe′)(SPc(w
′, t) + F ) + (1 − ce′)φ(w
′) ≥ φ(v′)
as φ(w′) denotes the cost of an optimal w′-t-path by induction hypothesis and
therefore φ(w′) ≤ SPc(w′, t) + F . Further note that φ(v′) ≥ φ(v) by choice of
v. In particular, this implies SPc(v, t) + F ≥ φ(v) by choosing P ′ as a shortest
v-t-path with respect to c. Thus, for arbitrary P ′ again,
fA(P
′) ≥
(
1− π(P ′[v, v′])
)
·
(
SPc(v, t) + F
)
+ π(P ′[v, v′]) · φ(v′) ≥ φ(v)
which proves that Pv is optimal. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3. There is an algorithm that solves FMPA in time O(|E|+|V | log |V |).
Proof. The optimality of the path computed by Algorithm 3 follows immediately
from Lemma A3. Shortest path distances from every vertex to t can be pre-
computed using Dijkstra’s algorithm in time O(|E|+ |V | log |V |). The remainder
of the algorithm can be implemented using a Fibonacci heap for computing the
vertex minimizing φ(v), guaranteeing the claimed running time. ⊓⊔
B Appendix for the Leader’s Maximization Problem
(Section 4)
B.1 Complexity (Proof of Theorem 5)
We reduce from the minimum directed multicut problem. An instance of this
problem is given by a directed graph G = (V,E) and k commodities specified
by origin-destination pairs (si, ti)i=1,...,k. A multicut M ⊆ E is a subset of edges
such that M ∩ P 6= ∅ for each path P ∈ Pi and each commodity i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
The task is to find a multicut of minimum cardinality. The corresponding decision
problem is to decide for a given graph G and an integer q whether G has a
multicut of cardinality at most q. The directed multicut problem is strongly
NP-hard even for k = 2; see Garg, Vazirani, Yannakakis: Multiway Cuts in
Directed and Node Weighted Graphs (ICALP 2014).
Theorem 5. LMPLX for L ∈ {fix, flex} and X ∈ {A,N} is strongly NP -hard,
even when restricted to instances with |K| = 2 and c ≡ 0.
Proof. Consider an instance I = (G, (si, ti)i=1,...,k, q) of the directed multicut
problem with G = (V,E), k = 2, and q ∈ Z+. We will construct an instance Iˆ =
(G, c,K, F, T,B) of the leader’s maximization problem as follows. We introduce
two commodities, one for each pair (si, ti) with i ∈ K := {1, 2}. We set ce = 0
for all e ∈ E, B = q and T1 = T2 = F = 1.
We denote by OPTLX the value of an optimal solution to LMP
L
X . Note that
since the travel costs are all zero, fN,p,i = fA,p,i for all i ∈ K and any setting
of probabilities p ∈ [0, 1]E . Furthermore Γ fixN,i(p) = minP∈Pi{fN,p,i(P ), Ti} =
Γ flexN,i (P ) as SPc(si, ti) = 0 for all i ∈ K. Therefore OPT
fix
N = OPT
flex
N =
OPTflexN = OPT
flex
A .
We claim the following equivalence proving the theorem.
OPTLX ≥ 2⇔ there exists a feasible multicut of cardinality q.
Suppose that there is a multicut M with |M | ≤ q. We then define pe = 1
for all e ∈ M and pe = 0 for all e ∈ E \M . Note that
∑
e∈E pe = |M | ≤ q,
implying that p is a feasible solution. Furthermore, every passenger encounters
an inspector with probability 1 because his path has to cross the multicut. We
thus obtain OPTLX ≥ 2.
Conversely, assume p ∈ [0, 1]E is a solution with profit 2. This implies that
fX,i,p(P ) = 1 for i ∈ K and every path P ∈ Pi. This is only possible if for every
P ∈ Pi, there is an e ∈ P with pe = 1. Therefore the set M = {e ∈ E : pe = 1}
is a multicut with cardinality |M | ≤
∑
e∈M pe ≤ q. ⊓⊔
B.2 The LP Relaxation (Proofs of Lemmas 2 to 5, Theorem 6,
and Corollary 2)
Lemma 2. OPTflexN ≥ OPT
fix
N and OPT
flex
A ≥ OPT
fix
A .
Proof. Let X ∈ {A,N}. Note that (1 − π(P ))F ≥ fX,p,i(P ) − SPc(si, ti) for all
p ∈ [0, 1]E, i ∈ K and any path P ∈ Pi. Therefore OPT
flex
X ≥ OPT
fix
X . ⊓⊔
For the proofs of Lemma 3 and Corollary 2, we will additionally use the
following stronger version of Theorem 4.
Lemma B1. Let OPTN be the cost of an optimal non-adaptive solution and
OPTA be the cost of an optimal adaptive solution. Then OPTN − SPc(s, t) ≤
4
3 (OPTA − SPc(s, t)).
Proof. Let P be a path that minimizes fA. Observe that
OPTA = fA(P ) ≥ π(P )c(P ) + (1− π(P ))(SPc(s, t) + F )
where the inequality is due to the fact that in any case, the passenger has at
least to traverse a shortest path from s to t. Furthermore,
OPTN ≤ min {c(P ) + (1 − π(P ))F, SPc(s, t) + F}
as both P and a shortest path from s to t are feasible non-adaptive solutions.
Thus,
OPTN − SPc(s, t)
OPTA − SPc(s, t)
≤ max
p∈[0,1], F≥0
0≤S≤C
min {C + pF, S + F} − S
(1− p)C + p(S + F )− S
= max
p∈[0,1], F≥0
0≤S≤C
min {C − S + pF, F}
(1− p)(C − S) + pF
.
If C − S + pF > F , then increasing S also increases the value of the right-hand
side function. If C − S + pF < F , then decreasing F increases the value of
the right-hand side function. Thus, if the right-hand side is maximized, then
C − S + pF = F . Therefore
OPTN − SPc(s, t)
OPTA − SPc(s, t)
≤ max
p∈[0,1]
F≥0
F
F (1 − p+ p2)
≤
4
3
,
which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. 43OPT
flex
A ≥ OPT
flex
N ≥ OPT
flex
A .
Proof. Let p ∈ [0, 1]E be any solution to the LMP instance. Note that Lemma B1
implies 43Γ
flex
A,i (p) ≥ Γ
flex
N,i (p) ≥ Γ
flex
A,i (p) for all i ∈ K, and therefore
4
3OPT
flex
A ≥
OPTflexN ≥ OPT
flex
A . ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. 1− π(P ) ≤ min
{∑
e∈P pe, 1
}
≤ 11−e−1 (1− π(P )).
Proof. We prove π(P ) =
∏
e∈P (1−pe) ≥ 1−
∑
e∈P pe by induction on |P |. This
is trivial for |P | = 1. For |P | > 1 observe that for any e′ ∈ P by induction
hypothesis
∏
e∈P
(1 − pe) ≥

1−∑
e∈P\{e′}
pe

 (1 − pe′) = 1−∑
e∈P
pe + pe′
∑
e∈P\{e′}
pe ≥ 1−
∑
e∈P
pe.
This immediately implies the first inequality stated in the lemma.
The second inequality of the lemma is trivially true if
∑
e∈P pe = 0. Thus
we assume the sum to be strictly positive without loss of generality. Define
σ := min{
∑
e∈P pe, 1} and observe that
∏
e∈P
(1− pe) ≤
(
1−
σ
|P |
)|P |
≤ e−σ .
Therefore
1− π(P )
σ
≥
1− e−σ
σ
≥ min
x∈(0,1]
1− e−x
x
.
The right-hand side is decreasing in x and therefore minimized for x = 1. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. OPTLP ≥ OPT
L
X for all L ∈ {flex, fix} and X ∈ {A,N}.
Proof. Let p ∈ [0, 1]E be an optimal solution to LMPflexN . For every i ∈ K, set
yi(si) = 0 and yi(v) = SPc+Fp(si, v) for all v ∈ V \ {si}. It is easy to check that
(p, y) is a feasible solution to [LP] and that yi(ti) − yi(si) ≥ SPc+pF (si, ti) for
every i ∈ K. Therefore
yi(ti)− yi(si)− SPc(si, ti) ≥ min
{∑
e∈P
(ce + Fpe)− SPc(si, ti) : P ∈ Pi
}
≥ min
{∑
e∈P
ce + (1 − π(P ))F − SPc(si, ti) : P ∈ Pi
}
= Γ flexN,i (p)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 4. This implies that the optimal
value of the LP is at least OPTflexN . By Lemmas 2 and 3, OPT
flex
N is as least as
large as the optimal solution value of any of the other versions. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6. There is a (1− 1/ e)-approximation algorithm for LMPflexN .
Proof. Let (p, y) be an optimal solution to [LP]. Note that yi(ti) − yi(si) ≤
SPc+Fp(si, ti) and define λi = yi(ti)− yi(si)− SPc(si, ti). Then
λi ≤ min
{∑
e∈P
(ce + Fpe)− SPc(si, ti), Ti
}
≤
∑
e∈P
ce − SPc(si, ti) + min
{∑
e∈P
pe, 1
}
· F
≤
1
1− e−1
(∑
e∈P
ce − SPc(si, ti) +
(
1−
∏
e∈P
(1− pe)
)
· F
)
for every P ∈ Pi by Lemma 4. Thus, setting the probabilities according to p
yields a solution to LMPflexN with profit∑
i∈K
diΓ
flex
N,i (p) ≥ (1 − 1/ e)
∑
i∈K
diλi ≥ (1− 1/ e)OPT
flex
N . ⊓⊔
Tightness of the approximation factor. The analysis of the algorithm given
in Theorem 6 is tight. To see this, consider the following example instance of
LMPflexN . Let G be a directed cycle of length n, i.e., V = {v1, . . . , vn} and E =
{e1, . . . , en} with ei = (vi, vi+1) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and en = (vn, v1). Let K
consist of n commodities with unit demand, such that si = vi and ti = vi−1 for
i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and s1 = v1 and t1 = vn. Note Pi consists of a unique path of
length n− 1 for every i ∈ K. Finally, let c = 0, F = Ti = 1 for every i ∈ K and
B = n/(n− 1). Observe that the optimal solution of [LP] sets pe = 1/(n− 1) for
every e ∈ E. Using these probabilities as a solution to LMPflexN yields a profit of
n ·
(
1− (1− 1
n−1 )
n−1
)
. On the other hand, setting pe1 = 1 and pen = 1/(n− 1)
yields a profit of n− 1+1/(n− 1). Note that by choosing n sufficiently large the
ratio between these two values can be brought arbitrarily close to 1− 1/ e.
Optimality gap when using [LP] for fixed fares. Unfortunately, [LP] does
not yield an approximation guarantee for the fixed-fare setting. To see this,
consider the following instance of LMPfixX . There are four nodes s1, t1, s2, t2,
together with edges from s1 to s2, s2 to t2, and t2 to t1, each with zero cost. In
addition, there are L parallel edges from s1 to t1, each with cost 1. Commodity
1 has origin s1 and destination t1 with a total demand of L. Commodity 2 has
origin s2 and destination t2 with a total demand of 1. The budget is 1/2+ ε and
the fine is 2. Observe that the optimal solution of the corresponding instance
of [LP] sets p(s2,t2) = 1/2 + ε and pe = 0 for all other edges. Interpreting these
probabilities as a solution of LMPfixX results in a profit of 1+2ε, as the followers
represented by commodity 1 will prefer one of the edges from s1 to t1 over the
three-edge path. However, setting p(s2,t2) = 1/2 instead yields a profit of L+ 1.
Corollary 2. There is a 34 (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for LMP
flex
A .
Proof. Again, let (p, y) be an optimal solution to [LP]. By Lemma B1 and the
proof of Theorem 6, Γ flexA,i (p) ≥
3
4Γ
flex
N,i (p) ≥
3
4 (1−1/e)(yi(ti)−yi(si)−SPc(si, ti))
for all i ∈ K. ⊓⊔
C Appendix for the Computational Study (Section 5)
C.1 Instances and Computational Setup
Generation of Planar Graphs. The graphs were generated using an approach
similar to the one in [8]. Vertices are distributed uniformly at random in the
plane; iteratively, a vertex is chosen uniformly at random and connected to
the closest neighbour that can be connected without violating planarity. This is
repeated 3|V |−6 times, after which disjoint connected components are connected
using nearest Euclidean neighbours in order to ensure that the entire graph is
connected. All arcs are present in both directions, as common in transit networks.
Ticket Prices. For the randomly generated instances, ticket prices were set to
Ti = b+m ·
SPc(si, ti)
maxv,w∈V SPc(v, w)
,
where b is a base price and b + m the maximum ticket price allowed in the
network. This linear formula is a simplification of the formula used for official
regulations regarding ticket prices in public transport networks [12,17].
Instance overview. Our study consist of seven graph sets, three based on
real-world transit networks and four generated using the randomization proce-
dure described above. Each set contains 40 different combinations of graphs,
customers and demands. For each of these combinations, twenty different bud-
get values were tested, leading to 800 different instances in each graph set; see
Table 2 for average graph sizes.
nlmajor nlcomplete adammetro small medium large huge
|V | 23 341 45 25 50 100 200
|E| 60 864 88 95 195 399 806
Table 2: Average data of test instances, showing the average numbers of vertices
and edges within each of the seven graph sets.
Implementation Details. All algorithms have been implemented in Java and
compiled using jre7 on Windows 7 Enterprise. Computations have been per-
formed on a machine with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU (GHz, 64 bit) and 4GB of
memory using CPLEX 12.4 API for Java for the mathematical programs.
C.2 Results
Computation times. Table 3 shows average computation times for the vari-
ous algorithms. Using the LP for computing start solutions, a local optimum was
reached within less than a minute for most instances, with the only exception
being very large graphs combined with the (non-polynomial) non-adaptive fol-
lowers’ response. Furthermore, note that for large instances with many commodi-
ties, and for budgets higher than 6, the mixed integer programming formulation
could not be solved in reasonable time.
graph set LP LPLSN LP
LS
A LPR LPR
LS
N LPR
LS
A MIP MIP
LS
N MIP
LS
A
nlmajor 0.17 10.2 1.59 1.39 10.6 1.68 6.31 9.93 1.62
nlcomplete 7.28 931 21 75.4 873 19.7 4024 563 7.57
adammetro 0.33 6.12 1.39 1.91 9.81 2.31 3.29 11.2 2.87
small 0.04 0.75 0.11 0.29 0.8 0.11 0.6 0.77 0.11
medium 0.06 4.5 0.18 0.32 4.9 0.19 1.5 3.90 0.18
large 0.15 32.8 0.81 0.99 44.6 0.9 5.1 34.60 0.87
huge 0.60 343.1 6.9 3.9 563.2 7.8 25.5 490.0 7.50
Table 3: Average computation time in seconds for fixed fares. LP, LPR and MIP
denote the solutions found by the corresponding mathematical program, and
AlgLSX with Alg ∈ {LP,LPR,MIP} and X ∈ {A,N} denotes the solution found
by performing the local search heuristic on the solution found by algorithm Alg,
using the followers response X .
Influence of Budget. The leader’s achievable revenue crucially depends on
the available budget. Figure 2 illustrates the quality of the solutions for the
adammetro and nlcomplete instances, as well as for a small and large random
instance, all with 50 commodities for the LMPfixN model, and the obtained rev-
enue.
Complete overview of solution quality. Tables 4 to 6 show average ratios
between solutions and upper bounds for all models. Here, LPR denotes the
linear relaxation of the mixed integer program from [1] (MIP).
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Fig. 2: Graphs illustrating the influence of the budget on the solution quality,
for the adammetro instance, the nlcomplete instance, a random instance with
25 vertices and a random instance with 100 vertices, each with 50 commodities
for the LMPfixN model. Note that the legend in the top-right graph applies to all
graphs. Graphs on the left show gaps relative to the upper bound, graphs on the
right show the corresponding profit. ’Best’ denotes the best solution found, LPLS
and MCLS denote the solutions found by performing the local search heuristic
on the LP solution resp. MultiCut solution, and MIP denotes the solution found
by the corresponding mathematical program from [1].
LMPflexN LMP
flex
A
graph set LP LPLS MC MCLS LP LPLS MC MCLS
nlmajor 96.4 98.0 52.8 85.2 96.4 98.0 52.8 85.2
nlcomplete 97.8 97.9 33.9 39.7 97.7 97.9 33.9 39.7
adammetro 94.7 97.8 69.0 86.7 94.7 97.8 69.0 86.7
small 95.3 97.5 49.1 77.7 95.3 97.4 49.0 77.5
medium 95.5 97.5 41.6 69.4 95.4 97.3 41.6 69.3
large 96.6 98.0 40.7 75.9 96.5 97.8 40.7 75.8
huge 96.5 97.9 37.2 71.1 96.4 97.7 37.2 71.2
Table 4: Average ratios between solutions and upper bounds in percent for test
instances in the flexible-fare setting. LPLS and MCLS denote the solutions found
by performing the local search heuristic on the LP solution and the MultiCut
solution, respectively.
graph set LP LPLS LPR LPRLS MIP MIPLS MC MCLS
nlmajor 94.1 97.2 94.8 97.2 94.7 97.3 52.2 85.1
nlcomplete 90.9 92.6 90.6 92.4 91.0 93.3 33.3 37.2
adammetro 94.7 97.8 92.0 97.5 91.7 97.3 69.0 86.7
small 88.1 96.0 89.9 96.3 89.8 96.3 48.7 74.1
medium 88.9 95.0 90.1 95.0 90.5 95.1 41.1 64.9
large 88.6 94.5 89.0 94.9 89.0 95.1 40.3 71.6
huge 85.2 92.7 87.8 93.3 88.1 94.0 36.8 64.8
Table 5: Average ratios between solutions and upper bounds in percent for test
instances with fixed ticket prices and adaptive followers. LP, LPR and MIP
denote the solutions found by the corresponding mathematical program, and
AlgLS with Alg ∈ {LP,LPR,MIP} denotes the solution found by performing
the local search heuristic on the solution found by algorithm Alg.
graph set LP LPLS LPR LPRLS MIP MIPLS MC MCLS
nlmajor 94.8 97.3 95.1 97.3 95.4 97.4 52.2 85.1
nlcomplete 91.6 93.2 91.9 93.6 93.4 94.4 33.3 37.1
adammetro 94.7 97.8 92.0 97.5 91.7 97.3 69.0 86.7
small 92.1 96.3 92.7 96.5 92.8 96.4 48.7 74.2
medium 90.7 95.2 91.8 95.4 91.9 95.6 41.1 64.9
large 90.4 95.1 90.8 95.2 91.3 95.4 40.3 71.7
huge 89.1 94.1 91.5 94.5 91.9 95.3 36.8 64.8
Table 6: Average ratios between solutions and upper bounds in percent for test
instances with fixed ticket prices and non-adaptive followers. LP, LPR and MIP
denote the solutions found by the corresponding mathematical program, and
AlgLS with Alg ∈ {LP,LPR,MIP} denotes the solution found by performing
the local search heuristic on the solution found by algorithm Alg.
